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1 Introduction 
The microelectronics industry is faced with increased costs of production of inte-
grated circuits (ICs). This increase is due to the costly technology refinement and 
the increasing complexity of systems (e.g. the transition from 32 nm to 28 nm 
technology has been accompanied by a 40% increase in the manufacturing costs of 
wafers 300 mm in diameter and by a 30% increase in the manufacturing costs of 
450 mm wafers). For several years, this led to a sharp increase in the number of 
companies that do not have the means to produce IC (fabless companies) and to 
the relocation of production. ICs manufactured today are produced with a high 
added value in a highly competitive industry. In addition, the time-to-market is in-
creasingly tight. This has made expensive devices the target of counterfeiting, 
cloning, illegal copy, theft and malicious hardware insertion (such as hardware 
Trojans) [1], [2]. 
1.1 The threat model of IC and IP 
The counterfeiting of ICs has become a major problem in recent years [3]. For ex-
ample, the number of counterfeit electronic circuits seized by U.S. Customs be-
tween 2001 and 2011 has been multiplied by around 700 [4]. Between 2007 and 
2010, U.S. Customs confiscated 5.6 million counterfeit electronic products [5]. 
Overall, counterfeiting is estimated to account for about 7% of the semiconductor 
market [6], which represents a loss of around US$ 22 billion in 2014 for the lawful 
industry. 
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Fig. 1 is a simplified diagram of the life cycle of an IC from its design by a fabless 
designer to its recycling. This cycle includes many threats to the designer’s intel-
lectual property: netlist theft, mask theft, chip over-production (overbuilding), 
theft of the untested device, discarded device, reverse engineering, device counter-
feiting, cloning, relabeled-repackaged-falsified “like new device”, and hardware 
Trojan insertion. 
Fig. 1. Simplified life cycle of an IC from a fabless designer to device recycling and the as-
sociated threat model.  
The threat model in Fig. 1 focuses on IC manufacturing and does not include the 
specific case of IP design and licensing. Indeed, for digital circuit design the re-
use of IP is more and more important due to prohibitive cost of ASIC design, but 
the IP business suffers from a lack a security due to the intrinsic form of IPs sales 
and exchanges. Figure 2 presents a dedicated threat model focused on an IP life 
cycle. Many dedicated threats target the IP life cycle and result to revenues losses 
for the IP designers [1], [2]. The IP threat model includes illegal re-use, illegal 
sales, cloning (illegal copy) of the IP. The extent of threats targeting IPs is linked 
to the type of IP: soft IPs (typically hardware description language files), firm IPs 
(synthesized netlist), and hard IPs (FPGA bitstream or physical layout). 
Fig. 2. Simplified life cycle of an IP with its threat model  
We propose a way to counter theft, illegal copy, cloning and counterfeiting of ICs 
and IPs by designing a salutary hardware (salware) [7]. The term salware is the 
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opposite of malware (malicious hardware). While salware can use the same tech-
niques, strategy and means as malware [7], salware uses an embedded piece of 
hardware that is barely detectable, hard to circumvent, and is inserted in an IC or 
an IP to provide intellectual property information and/or to remotely activate the 
circuit or IP after its manufacture and during its use. IP watermarking, physical 
unclonable function (PUF) for IC authentication, remote activation, logic encryp-
tion, finite state machine (FSM) encryption, memory encryption, bus encryption, 
hardware metering, VHDL/Verilog obfuscation, bitstream encryption (for SRAM 
and Flash based FPGAs), are examples of the well-known salwares. 
One of the solutions for the IP designers to protect their intellectual property is to 
be able to detect the presence of a copy of an IP embedded in a digital device by 
using IP identification. Works on IP watermarking and IP fingerprinting try to 
provide the IP identification service. But, most of the time the published solutions 
are not practical mainly because of the complexity of the watermark-
ing/fingerprinting verification scheme [8], [9]. Efficient IP identification scheme 
needs to be contactless, rapid and ultra-lightweight. Up to now, these three charac-
teristics are not available in the state-of-the-art. To meet these requirements, in 
this chapter we propose an ultra-lightweight binary frequency shift keying (BFSK) 
transmitter to forward IP identity (that could be generated for example by a feed-
back shift-register or a physical unclonable function [10]) discreetly using an elec-
tromagnetic channel. Such circuit is usually called “spy circuitry”. Using the elec-
tromagnetic channel, it is possible to contactless check the presence of an IP inside 
a digital device. A preliminary version of this work was presented during the con-
ference VLSI-SOC 2015 [11]. 
1.1 Salware vs. malware 
In the area of security, the techniques used to attack and to defend have always 
been similar and the means designed for attacks can sometimes be used for protec-
tion. Our strategy in investigating the means of attack and malicious hardware is 
to develop new efficient salware. 
Small, barely detectable hardware Trojans can disable part of a device or allow in-
formation leakage without degrading system performance [12], [13].  The same 
characteristics are required to design efficient salware, which is our objective. 
Embedding a Trojan inside an IP to protect the IP during its time-limited evalua-
tion by the client was recently proposed in [14]. This work modifies the FSM of 
the IP with the aim of disrupting its normal behavior. In this way, the IP vendor 
can define the “expiry date” of the FSM control and disable it. In fact, this appli-
cation uses a Trojan like time-based activation mechanism [12], [13]. Other acti-
vation mechanisms can be used to disrupt the IP in the case of illegal use such as 
an expired hardware license or an illegal copy. For example, a Trojan-like salware 
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can use a PUF response to conditionally block an IP execution. Such a physical-
condition-based activation makes it possible to link an IP to the hardware (hard-
ware-linked license). 
 Another well-known threat in cryptographic engineering is side channel attacks 
[15], [16]. Most of the dynamic characteristics of both hardware and software im-
plementations of cryptographic primitives can be used for side channel analysis: 
computation time, power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, optical radia-
tion, even the sound produced during computation. However, the techniques used 
for side channel analysis can be used to implement a salware block: e.g. for read-
ing intellectual property data from the device or for device authentication (water-
mark checking). Some published works propose spy circuitry using side channels 
to identify the embedded intellectual property. For example in [17], the thermal 
channel representing a contactless communication was used to transfer infor-
mation from an embedded tag to a remote receiver. However the embedded ther-
mal tag used in this commercial solution requires a relatively large area (255 Spar-
tan-3 slices). In [18], the authors propose using two shift registers to generate a 
recognizable signature-dependent power consumption pattern to reveal the IP sig-
nature. Power consumption was also used in [19] to communicate the IP water-
mark data using classical differential power analysis (DPA [15]). To reinforce 
such work, the authors of [20] propose using the power supply signal of an IP as a 
physical hash function for fingerprinting. 
As we mentioned above, hardware Trojans can be designed to change the opera-
tion of the infected device, but also to silently leak information. Hardware Trojans 
can use side channels to forward secret information such as a symmetric cipher 
key [21] from cryptographic hardware implementation [22], [23], even when se-
cure key management is used [24]. Hardware Trojan is also used to cause or am-
plify side-channel leakage of cryptographic hardware [25]. Note that using side 
channels to detect a hardware Trojan has also been the subject of several studies 
[26], [27], [28].  
However, designing salware with a Trojan-like hardware could present a new op-
portunity to protect IC and IP. In this paper, we propose a, Trojan-like, IC/IP in-
formation provider that is discreet, contactless, ultra-lightweight, and with a high 
bitrate. It uses an electromagnetic side channel to transmit useful information. 
Except [17], all the related works use power consumption as a communication 
channel which is not contactless. Unlike the proposed solution, all the related 
works are not lightweight and rapid as the section 5 of this chapter will show. 
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2 EM communication of IP data 
2.1 Principle 
Previous works on the electromagnetic attacks targeting true random number gen-
erators (TRNGs) showed that electromagnetic radiation can be used very efficient-
ly for both active (fault injection [29]) and passive (side channel analysis [30]) at-
tacks. Compared to power analysis, the attacker measuring the near-field 
electromagnetic emissions can obtain additional partial information about the de-
vice, since, unlike measurement of power consumption, electromagnetic radiation 
can be measured locally. One of the main advantages of this side channel is that it 
is impossible to hide the leak concerning electromagnetic radiation by using a 
global countermeasure. Moreover the electromagnetic test bench is not expensive 
(less than US$ 10K without an oscilloscope, which is the most expensive compo-
nent). Last but not least, a spectral analysis of the electromagnetic radiation pro-
vides information on the oscillating structure such as a ring-oscillator [30]. For all 
these reasons, we use the electromagnetic channel for our IC/IP identification 
scheme. To this end, we designed an ultra-lightweight BFSK transmitter. 
As mentioned above, salware and malware can be based on similar principles. The 
same is true for the proposed BFSK principle, which can be used to design both 
salware (i.e. IP identity transmitter) and malware (i.e. stolen data transmitter driv-
en by a hardware Trojan), as illustrated in Figure 3. There are two differences be-
tween using the BFSK as salware or malware. First, IP identification is activated 
outside the device by an ID checker, while the Trojan is activated internally. For 
example, the Trojan can be activated by a specific event (e.g. specific input se-
quence, internal data value, system state) or by pre-defined timing (e.g. a specific 
number of clock cycles) [12], [13]. Second, the enable signal of the BFSK trans-
mitter is provided outside the salware: it is the same signal as that used to activate 
the IP identification. For malware, the BFSK transmitter’s enable signal is driven 
internally by the hardware Trojan control logic. In this case, the Trojan activates 
the enable signal when it is ready to send the stolen data. Note that an enable sig-
nal is required in both applications to reduce the power consumed by the ring os-
cillator. Moreover, a permanently activated transmitter could be detected more 
easily by a spectral analysis of electromagnetic emanations of the device and 
could also cause local heating and premature aging of the chip.  
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Fig. 3. Electromagnetic transmission of data (i.e. IP identification data or stolen secret data by a 
hardware Trojan such as the secret key for symmetric cipher). 
2.2 Ultra-lightweight digital BFSK transmitter 
Electromagnetic radiation is an efficient side channel since, unlike measurement 
of power consumption, electromagnetic radiation can be measured locally. For this 
reason, we use the electromagnetic channel for our IP identification scheme. To 
this end, we designed an ultra-lightweight BFSK transmitter which could be acti-
vated outside the device by an ID checker or internally by a specific event (e.g. 
specific input sequence, internal data value, system state). Note that an enable sig-
nal is required to reduce the power consumed by the ring oscillator. Moreover, a 
permanently activated transmitter could be detected more easily by a spectral 
analysis of electromagnetic emanations of the device and could also cause local 
heating and premature aging of the chip. 
BFSK is one of the common modulation schemes used in digital communication. 
The binary data are sent using a sinusoidal carrier at two frequency tones f0 and f1, 
representing high (‘1’) and low (‘0’) logic levels. The binary data arriving at the 
transmitter input at certain bitrates determine the commutation of the tones at the 
transmitter output. The proposed BFSK transmitter uses a dedicated configurable 
ring-oscillator, as shown in Fig. 4. The configurable ring-oscillator is designed us-
ing one multiplexor, N+K delay elements, and a feedback chain controlled by a 
NAND gate for activation of transmission to reduce power consumption. Actually, 
the transmitter is used only during a short time when the enable signal is high, and 
it consumes power only during this small piece of time. The power consumption 
of this transmitter is thus completely negligible. 
Input data controls the multiplexor, as shown in Fig. 4. When input data is low, 
the ring oscillator uses N delays and its oscillation frequency is f0. When input da-
ta is high, the ring oscillator uses N+K delays and its oscillation frequency is f1. 
Since the ring oscillator’s oscillation frequency decreases with an increase in the 
number of delay elements, frequency f0 is higher than frequency f1. These two fre-
quencies have to be selected according to the bandwidth of the electromagnetic 
analysis platform, which is used to acquire and measure the transmitted signal. 
7 
The bandwidth of our test bench, which is described in Section 3, was limited to 
100 MHz and 1 GHz by the low-noise amplifier. 
Fig. 4. Architecture of the ultra-lightweight digital BFSK transmitter based on a configu-
rable ring oscillator.  
The proposed BFSK transmitter was implemented in Microsemi FUSION flash 
based FPGA (130 nm CMOS technology) containing 600K logic gates 
(M7AFS600). The device contains 13 824 tiles, each tile can be used to implement 
one D-flip-flop or one configurable multiplexor-based logic block implementing 
any 3-input logic function. 
The configurable number of delays in the ring oscillator of the proposed BFSK 
transmitter makes it possible to select precisely the two frequencies f0 and f1 using 
parameters N and K. Table I lists the ring oscillator frequencies and the number of 
Fusion tiles used by the BFSK transmitter for five values of N and K, with N rang-
ing from 0 to 4, and K ranging from 1 to 5. According to Table I, f0 can be chosen 
between 119 MHz (N=4) and 385 MHz (N=0) and f1 can be chosen between 70 
MHz (N=4, K=5) and 280 MHz (N=0, K=1). The exact value of f0 depends on the 
number of delay elements, but also on the placement and routing of the transmit-
ter. For the values N and K listed in Table I, the frequency variation was less than 
1.7% (the maximum frequency deviation in Table I is 2 MHz when N = 4). 
The number of tiles used by the BFSK transmitter is very low, i.e. from 3 tiles 
(N=0, K=1) to 11 tiles (N=4, K=5). These values are equivalent to less than 
0.022% and less than 0.080% of the total number of tiles included in the targeted 
600K-gate FUSION FPGA, respectively. This very small number of tiles is very 
promising for good dissimulation of the BFSK transmitter inside the sea of 
gates/tiles. The number of FUSION tiles required by the BFSK transmitter is giv-
en by the following equation (i). 
Number_FTiles = N + K + 2    (i) 
In order to estimate the number of resources needed for implementation with Xil-
inx SRAM FPGA or Altera SRAM FPGA, Table I gives the number of 4-input 
look-up-tables (LUT4) used by the BFSK transmitter with such FPGAs. The num-
ber of LUT4 required by the BFSK transmitter is given by the following equation 
(ii). 
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TABLE I.  Hardware implementation results of the BFSK 
transmitter 
N  K  f0 
(MHz) 
f1 
(MHz) 
Fusion 
Tiles  LUT4  EG 
0 
1  385  280  3  2  4.67 
2  383  210  4  3  5.34 
3  384  151  5  4  6.01 
4  385  130  6  5  6.68 
5  381  111  7  6  7.35 
1 
1  272  189  4  3  5.34 
2  272  156  5  4  6.01 
3  270  120  6  5  6.68 
4  271  106  7  6  7.35 
5  269  93  8  7  8.02 
2 
1  168  144  5  4  6.01 
2  169  124  6  5  6.68 
3  169  100  7  6  7.35 
4  168  91  8  7  8.02 
5  168  79  9  8  8.69 
3 
1  146  128  6  5  6.68 
2  147  112  7  4  7.35 
3  146  92  8  5  8.02 
4  145  84  9  6  8.69 
5  144  74  10  7  9.36 
4 
1  123  110  7  6  7.35 
2  121  98  8  7  8.02 
3  122  83  9  8  8.69 
4  121  77  10  9  9.36 
5  119  70  11  10  10.03 
Number_LUT4 = N + K + 1    (ii) 
To evaluate the logical resources needed by the BFSK transmitter in ASIC imple-
mentations, the right hand column in Table I gives the number of equivalent gates 
(EG) in the transmitter. The gate count was estimated using the Virtual Silicon  
standard cell library based on the UMC L180 0.18 µm 1P6M Logic process 
(UMCL18G212T3 [31]). The delay gates are replaced by more efficient standard 
NOT gates. The gate count of a standard NOT gate is 0.67 EG, and that of the 
standard multiplexor, 2.33 EG. The standard NAND gate uses 1 EG. So the num-
ber of gates of the whole BFSK transmitter ranges from 4.67 EG (N = 0, K = 1) to 
10.03 EG (N = 4, K = 5). Note that one flip-flop requires between 5.33 EG and 
12.33 EG to store a single bit [31].  
Such a transmitter is clearly ultra-lightweight in both FPGA and ASIC implemen-
tations. The small logical resources requirement of the proposed spy circuitry 
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makes reverse engineering it harder, although not impossible [32]. Even with re-
cent CMOS technologies, the attacker can reverse engineer ICs using a scanning 
electron microscope and an automatic tool for circuitry extraction [32], [33]. Nev-
ertheless, the smaller the piece of hardware used for BFSK transmitter the harder 
it is to detect during reverse engineering. Detection of the transmitter using stand-
ard Trojan detection methods [34], [35] is not feasible because the transmitter 
does not change the data path of the circuit and because of the ultra-low signal-to-
noise ratio on the electromagnetic channel, as shown in our experimental results 
below (Section 4). 
3. Experimental results 
The electromagnetic radiation of the device was evaluated using the near-field 
electromagnetic analysis test bench described in [30]. The border between the far 
field and the near field can be considered to be about 23 mm from the device, de-
pending on the hardware concerned. The most important part of the test bench is 
the acquisition chain. It determines the signal to noise ratio and measurement pre-
cision. 
The chain, as presented in Fig. 5, is composed of: 
 A Langer magnetic probe with a frequency range of from 30 MHz to 3 GHz 
and a spatial resolution of approximately 500 µm. 
 A Miteq low-noise amplifier with a frequency range of from 100 MHz to 1 
GHz. 
 A Tektronix real time signal analyzers RSA5106B with a frequency range from 
1Hz to 6.2GHz [36]. 
As presented in Fig. 5, the device to be tested (the board) is fixed to a XYZ table 
with repeatability of movement of 1 µm. The test bench, including the acquisition 
chain, XYZ table, FPGA configuration and power supply variations, is controlled 
by a computer. This test bench was first developed for electromagnetic attacks of 
TRNGs [29], and [30]. 
The targeted FPGA for the experimental work is an Altera Cyclone III EP3C25 
that uses a 65nm CMOS technology. It contains 24 624 four-inputs LUT and 
608 256 RAM bits.  
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Fig. 5. Near-field electromagnetic analysis test bench 
Electromagnetic analysis of IC is contactless, local, and can be spatial or/and tem-
poral. This last point makes it possible to perform frequency analysis of the elec-
tromagnetic emanation. In the your bench the spectral range is limited to 100 MHz 
and 1 GHz. Standard devices aimed at direct BFSK demodulation cannot be used 
for these relatively high frequencies. Available integrated BFSK demodulators are 
limited to a few dozen megahertz. For this reason, we developed a dedicated 
BFSK demodulation scheme for our needs, in which a spectral analysis of the low 
noise amplifier output (a component of the test bench) is performed to measure the 
f0 and f1 spectral contribution. The transmitted high (low) level is detected when f1 
spectral contribution is higher (lower) than that of f0. 
For the coherent demodulation of the electromagnetic radiation, we propose a 
slippery window spectral analysis. Indeed, overall spectral analysis masks the ef-
fects of the no stationarity of the signal and therefore provides no information 
about its temporal evolution. Slippery window spectral analysis is a three-
dimensional representation of the signal: amplitude, frequency, and time. It re-
quires two quantities Fw, the width of the FFT window frame and the difference 
Δτ between two frames. For our experiment, we chose Fw equal to 16 384 points 
(214-point FFT) and Δτ equal to 100 points. For each frame, the FFT provides the 
software demodulator with the amplitude of signals f0 and f1 which enables the 
demodulator to distinguish between a transmitted ‘1’ or ‘0’. 
To illustrate data transmission from the circuit via the EM channel, we used a shift 
register that stored the following 16-bit sequence:  “0101000111110011”. The 
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clock frequency of the shift register is 1 MHz. When the enable signal of the 
transmitter is given, the sequence is sent cyclically to the BFSK transmitter, which 
transmits it via the electromagnetic channel. The following gives the result of the 
coherent demodulation obtained at a 1 Mbps bit rate, which served as a proof of 
concept. 
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 present the temporal evolution of the spectral analysis (ampli-
tude) of the BFSK transmitter’s electromagnetic emission when N = 6 and K = 10, 
which corresponds to the following frequencies: f0 = 289 MHz (Fig. 6) and f1 = 
119 MHz (Fig. 7). Notice also that we placed a small antenna in the close vicinity 
of the ring. With N = 6 and K = 10 the BFSK transmitter uses only 17 four-inputs 
LUT of the FPGA that represents 0.065% of the available logical resources of the 
used Altera FPGA for theses experimental results. 
 
Fig. 6. Amplitude vs time evolution of the spectral analysis at f0 = 289 MHz.  
For the direct coherent demodulation of the electromagnetic radiation, we propose 
to use a slippery window spectral analysis in order to obtain a spectral cartog-
raphy. Indeed, overall spectral analysis masks the effects of the non-stationarity of 
the signal and therefore provides no information about its temporal evolution. 
Slippery window spectral analysis provides a three-dimensional representation of 
the signal (spectral cartography): amplitude, frequency, and time. The used Tek-
tronix real time signal analyzers [36] allows us to obtain directly the spectral car-
tography with direct reading of the patent that contains the transmitted data se-
quence. Fig 8 shows the spectral cartographies obtained at f0 = 289 MHz and f1 = 
119 MHz. 
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Fig. 7. Amplitude vs time evolution of the spectral analysis at f0 = 119 MHz.  
Fig. 8. Spectral cartographies center (red trace) on  f0 = 289 MHz (left) and on f1 = 119 
MHz (right) with 1Mbps data rate.  
Without knowledge of the BFSK parameters, the electromagnetic transmission 
cannot be easily detected because it cannot be distinguished from spectral noise. 
The signal-to-noise ratio of the BFSK transmission is -135 dB for a 1 GHz band-
width. Such an ultra-low SNR represents efficient protection against unwanted 
BFSK transmitter detection via a side channel. However, knowing the N and K pa-
rameters, the BFSK designer can calibrate the demodulation (determine the two 
frequencies) by electromagnetic analysis of the ring oscillators based on the dif-
ferential spectral analysis as described in [30]. 
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4 Second version of the ultra-lightweight digital EM 
transmitter 
Now, based on the previous experimental results we propose an enhance EM 
transmitter. Indeed, by using the Tektronix real time signal analyzers [36], we are 
able to clearly distinguish the transmitter data sequence by analyzing the spectral 
cartography at only one frequency. Originally, we use two frequencies in order to 
simplify the demodulation [11].  
The new version of the transmitter is based on the use of only one frequency with 
an on-off controllable ring-oscillator. The binary data are sent using only one si-
nusoidal carrier at f0 representing high (‘1’) logic level. A low (‘0’) logic level is 
obtained without transmit sinusoidal carrier (i.e. the ring-oscillator is off). The 
proposed EM transmitter uses an on-off controllable configurable ring-oscillator, 
as shown in Fig. 9. The on-off controllable ring-oscillator is designed using one 
multiplexor and K delay elements, and a feedback chain controlled by a two 
NAND gate for activation of transmission. The logical resource required for this 
transmitter is really low because it uses only K 4-inputs LUT with Altera and Xil-
inx FPGAs. 
Fig. 9. Architecture of the ultra-lightweight digital EM transmitter based on 
an on-off controllable ring oscillator.  
The previously presented (Fig. 5) experimental setup is used to test this transmit-
ter. The parameter K is fixed to 6 to set the frequency f0 to 309 MHz. The Fig. 10 
presents the measured spectral cartographies center to f0 with four data rates from 
1 Mbps to 16 Mbps (we used the same data sequence that for the Fig. 8). This fig-
ure shows that it is possible to demodulate the transmitted sequence for 1 Mbps 
and 2 Mbps data rates without signal processing. It is harder to directly demodu-
late the data for 4 Mbps and 16 Mbps data rates, but they could be demodulated by 
using signal processing. These results clearly validate the proof of concept of the 
proposed EM transmitter. Nevertheless, the provided results (Fig. 10) are given 
when the EM transmitter works alone inside the FPGA.  
    
Input data 
K delays
Enable
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Fig. 10. Spectral cartographies center (red trace) on  f0 = 309 MHz with 1Mbps data rate 
(a), 2 Mbps (b), 4 Mpbs (c) and 16 Mbps (d).  
In order to test the behavior of the EM transmitter when it is embedded in a larger 
system we add two large IPs in the FPGA. These two IPs are an AES cipher and a 
AES decipher [21]. These two IPs require 1 772 LUT4 (4.76 % of the targeted Al-
tera FPGA) when the EM transmitter requires only 6 LUT4 (0.025 % of the tar-
geted Altera FPGA). The transmitter ratio between the two IPs and the EM trans-
mitter is equal to 295.3. Fig. 11 presents the floorplan of the FPGA after 
configuration. Notice that we have forced the placement of the EM transmitter in 
order to place it in the center of the full system. 
In this case, it is always possible to demodulate the data sequence with 1 Mbps da-
ta rate. Nevertheless, it could be necessary to precisely place the EM probe over 
the device under test. Fig. 12 illustrates the modification of the spectral cartog-
raphy at f0 function of the positions of the probe. Four positions, P#0, P#1, P#2 and 
P#3 are tested on the same horizontal axis. The space between each position is a 3 
mm gap. On Fig. 12, it appears that the data sequence is always visible, but du to 
other spectral contributions that come from the two other IPs inside the device, it 
is more difficult to directly demodulate the sequence for the positions P#0 and P#1. 
The position P#2 gives the best result. This research of the best position is really 
fast for the designer of the system because he knows the precise position of the 
EM transmitter inside the chip.   
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Fig. 11. Floorplan of the test system with one AES cipher, one AES decipher and the EM  
transmitter.  
5 Comparison with state of the art spy circuitries using a side-
channel 
Table II compares the implementation of the proposed ultra-lightweight BFSK 
transmitter with other recently published state of the art methods. Table II gives 
the spy circuitry application (App.) for each reference; this may be IP protection 
(IPP) or hardware Trojan (HT) or both (for the presented work, PW [11]). In addi-
tion, Table II gives the year of publication (YoP), the side channel used, the hard-
ware resources required only for the leakage generator (for example we do not 
take the hardware used for IP watermark generation or the Trojan’s payload into 
account). Unfortunately, the principles compared do not use the same amount of 
hardware resources. For the sake of correctness, we give the implementation re-
sults as they are presented in the referenced papers. Nevertheless, the implementa-
tion bitrate of these previously published works can be roughly compared with our 
proposed solution. Based on published data, we computed the bitrate of all the 
proposals by using the number of clock cycles needed to send information via the 
side channel. For all the references presented in this table, the bitrate was comput-
ed using a 1 MHz frequency for data synchronization (same frequency is used dur-
ing the experimental works presented previously). 
As can be seen in Table II, the proposed work reaches the highest bitrate. The rea-
son for such a good performance is first that we use a spectral analysis of the local 
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electromagnetic leak based on a simple frequency modulation. Except for [17], all 
the other solutions use a global measurement of power consumption, which reduc-
es the signal-to-noise ratio of the information leaked via the side channel. Our 
proposal is clearly the smallest spy circuitry ever published. Although solutions 
based on circular shift-registers are well adapted to last generation FPGA families, 
since the 16-bit shift registers can be designed using only one look-up table, they 
are not suitable for ASIC technologies. Currently, an ASIC implementation of a 
16-bit shift register requires 16 flip-flops whereas the solution we propose occu-
pies an area equivalent to only one D-flip-flop. 
In this chapter, we present the proposed spy circuitry for IP protection, but it can 
also be used for hardware Trojan. Most of the other proposals could also be used 
for both applications. Note that in 2012, Kasper et al. proposed to use the work 
initiated in [22] for hardware Trojan or IP watermarking implementation [37]. 
However, by using electromagnetic emanation and a configurable ring oscillator, 
the proposed solution is the most convincing for industrial applications (e.g., those 
aimed at IP protection) because of its very small area and high bitrate. 
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF CHARACTERISTICS OF SPY CIRCUITRIES EXPLOITING SIDE‐CHANNELS 
App.  Ref.  YoP  Side channel  Hardware resources  Target  Bit rate @1MHz 
IPP 
[17]  2008  Thermal emanation  255 Spartan‐3 slices  Xilinx Spartan‐3  14.10‐3 bps 
[18]  2008  Power consumption  16 * 16‐bit circular shift‐
registers 
Xilinx Spartan‐3 
and Virtex‐II  400 bps 
[19]  2010  Power consumption  16‐bit circular shift‐register  Xilinx Virtex‐II Pro  1 Kbps 
HT 
[22]  2009  Power consumption  8 parallel D‐flip‐flops or 16‐bit circular shit register 
Xilinx Spartan‐3E 
and Virtex‐II Pro  970 bps 
[23]  2013  Power consumption  16‐bit circular shift‐registers 
per bit  Xilinx Virtex‐5  1.9 kbps 
Both  PW  2015  Electro‐magnetic emanation  1 configurable ring‐oscillator 
(like a D‐flip‐flop in ASIC)  Altera Cyclone III  1 Mbps 
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Fig. 12. Spectral cartographies center (red trace) on  f0 = 309 MHz with 1Mbps data rate 
for four different positions of the EM probe over the chip.  
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6 Industrial scenarios using the proposed IP protection 
According to the previous section, in comparison with other works, our proposal 
goes clearly towards using a spy circuit in an industrial context for IP protection. 
Two industrial scenarios are presented in the following. The first scenario is the 
identification of embedded IP in the supply chain. This identification is used in 
order to be sure to don’t use counterfeiting (fake) devices. 
It is therefore crucial and strategic to be able to detect counterfeit IC as soon as 
possible in the supply chain (this is particularly crucial for military and space grad 
devices). Fig. 13 shows a possible framework to manage the device under test 
(control the enable signal) and check the IP identification by using an EM probe, 
an amplifier and a dedicated acquisition system including a spectral analysis and 
the proposed demodulation method. Due to the high bit rate of the proposition so-
lution the identification of the ID requires less than 500 µs (with 1 Mbps bit rate). 
This counterfeiting detection could be completed by other physical (invasive or 
not) and optical inspection [38].    
  
Fig. 13. Rapid and contactless IP identification in the supply chain by using EM transmis-
sion of IP’ ID.  
The second scenario occurs when an IP designers would like to verify the illegal 
presence of its IP inside a device (ASIC or FPGA). In this case the proposed 
transmitter provides to the identification scheme a data like a PUF [39] or a wa-
termarking. Watermarking is a technique of steganography which provides the 
ownership of an IC (or an IP) by checking for the presence of hidden information 
called the watermark [8], [9]. Most of the watermarking methods proposed in the 
literature need a complex verification scheme. Nevertheless it is possible to use 
power consumption as proposed in [9] but it is easy and cheap to use global coun-
termeasure in order to mask the power consumption due to the watermark [40]. 
Using electromagnetic emanation in this scenario is better because as electromag-
netic emanation is local it is really hard to mask it by using a global countermeas-
ure. Moreover, in this paper we have shown that due to the SNR of BFSK signal, 
it is unrealistic to try to detect it without the precise knowledge of the used fre-
quencies for data transmission. 
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Conclusion 
IP protection has become crucial topics for hardware security due to the lack of 
trust in IP market. In this chapter, we have presented two ultra-lightweight trans-
mitters of IP identity using the electromagnetic side channel. Based on a configu-
rable ring oscillator, our first solution exploits a BFSK signal to transmit infor-
mation by way of the electromagnetic channel. Our second version is simpler; it is 
based on an on-off ring oscillator to transmit information with only one frequency. 
By performing a slippery window spectral analysis of the near field electromag-
netic emanations captured locally over the transmitter circuitry, the proposed 
transmission achieves a high bitrate (experimentally at less 1 Mbps), which has 
not been achieved before. Moreover, the transmitter occupies very small area less 
than the requirement of a small D-flip-flop. Such a small requirement of logical 
resources makes reverse engineering of the chip very difficult and detection of the 
transmitter using standard Trojan detection methods is not feasible. 
Acknowledgment 
The work presented in this paper was realized in the frame of the SALWARE pro-
ject number ANR-13-JS03-0003 supported by the French ”Agence Nationale de la 
Recherche”and by the French “Fondation de Recherche pour l’Aéronautique et 
l’Espace”. 
References 
[1] A. Rostami, F. Koushanfar, J. Rajendran, R. Karri, “Hardware Security: Threat Models and Met-
rics,” In Proceedings of the 32nd IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided De-
sign, ICCAD 2013, pp. 819-823, November 2013. 
[2] B. Colombier, L. Bossuet, "Survey of hardware protection of design data for integrated circuits 
and intellectual properties," Computers & Digital Techniques, IET, vol.8, no.6, pp.274,287, 2014. 
[3] H. Ke, J.M. Carulli, Y. Makris, “Counterfeit electronics: A rising threat in the semiconductor 
manufacturing industry,” In Proceedings of the IEEE International Test Conference, ITC 2013, 
pp. 1-4, September 2013 
[4] C. Gorman, “Counterfeit Chips on the Rise,” IEEE Spectrum, June 2012. 
[5] AGMA, Alliance for Gray Markets and Counterfeit Adatement, http://www.agmaglobal.org 
[6] M. Pecht, and S. Tiku, “Bogus! Electronic manufacturing and consumers confront a rising tide of 
counterfeit electronics,” IEEE Spectrum, May 2006. 
[7] L. Bossuet, D. Hely, “SALWARE: Salutary Hardware to design Trusted IC,” In Workshop on 
Trustworthy Manufacturing and Utilization of Secure Devices, TRUDEVICE 2013, Mai 2013. 
[8] B. Legal, L. Bossuet, “Automatic low-cost IP watermarking technique based on output mark in-
sertion,” Journal of Design Automation for Embedded System, Springer, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 71-
92, June 2012. 
20  
[9] C. Marchand, L. Bossuet, E. Jung, "IP watermark verification based on power consumption anal-
ysis," In Proceedings of the 27th IEEE International System-on-Chip Conference, SOCC 2014, 
pp. 330-335, 2014. 
[10]  
[11] Myth, Fact or Busted? A Security Evaluation of Physically Unclonalble Functions Cast in Sili-
con,” In Proceedings of the Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 
CHES 2012, Spinger, Lecture Note on Computer Science, vol. 7428, pp. 283-301, September 
2012. 
[12] L. Bossuet, P. Bayon, V. Fischer, “Contactless transmission of intellectual property data to pro-
tect FPGAs designs”, In Proceedings of the IFIP/IEEE International Conference on Very Large 
Scale Integration, VLSI-SOC 2015, pp. 19-24, 2015  
[13] R. Karri, J. Rajendran, K. Rosenfeld, and M. Tehranipoor, “Trustworthy Hardware: Identifying 
and Classifying Hardware Trojans,” Computer, IEEE, vol.43, no.10, pp. 39-46, October 2010. 
[14] M. Tehranipoor, and F. Koushanfar, “A Survey of Hardware Trojan Taxonomy and Detection,” 
Design & Test of Computers, IEEE, vol.27, no.1, pp. 10-25, January-February 2010. 
[15] S. Narasimhan, S. Bhunia, and R. S. Chakraborty, “Hardware IP Protection During Evaluation 
Using Embedded Sequential Trojan,” Design & Test of Computers, IEEE , vol.29, no.3, pp.70-
79, June 2012. 
[16] P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, B. Jun, “Differential Power Analysis”, in Wiener M. (Ed.), Proceedings of the 
19th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 1999, Springer, Lecture Note on 
Computer Science, vol. 1666, pp. 388-397, August 1999. 
[17] N. Kamoun, L. Bossuet, A. Gazel, “Experimental Implementation of 2ODPA attacks on AES de-
sign with flash-based FPGA Technology,” in proceedings of the 22nd IEEE International Confer-
ence on Microelectronics, IMC 2010, pp. 407-410, 2010. 
[18] C. Marsh, T.  Kean, D. Mclaren, “Protecting designs with a passive thermal tag,” In Proceedings 
of the 15th IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Circuits and Systems, ICECS 2008, 
pp.218-221, September 2008. 
[19] D. Ziener, J. Teich, “Power Signature Watermarking of IP Cores for FPGAs,” Journal of Signal 
Processing Systems, Springer, vol. 51, pp. 123-136, 2008. 
[20] G. T. Becker, M. Kasper, A. Moradi and C. Paar, “Side-channel based watermarks for integrated 
circuits,” In Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security 
and Trust, HOST 2010, pp. 30-35, June 2010. 
[21] S. Kerckhof, F. Durvaux, F.X. Standaert, and B. Gérard, “Intellectual Property Protection for 
FPGA Designs with Soft Physical Hash Functions: First Experimental Results,” In Proceedings 
of the IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, HOST 2013, pp. 
7-12, June 2013. 
[22] L. Bossuet, M. Grand, L. Gaspar, V. Fischer, G. Gogniat, “Architectures of flexible symmetric 
key crypto engines – a survey: from hardware coprocessor to multi-crypto-processor system on 
chip”, ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 45, No. 4, Article 41, 32 pages, Aout 2013.  
[23] L. Lin, M. Kasper, T. Güneysu, C. Paar, W. Burleson, “Trojan Side-Channels: Lightweight 
hardware Trojans through Side-Channel Engineering”, In Proceedings of Workshop on Crypto-
graphic Hardware and Embedded Systems,  CHES 2009, Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science,  vol. 5747, pp. 382-395, September 2009. 
[24] S. Kutzner, A. Poschmann, and M. Stöttinger, “TROJANUS: An Ultra-Lightweight Side-Channel 
Leakage Generator for FPGAs”, In Proceedings of International Conference on Field-
Programmable Technology, ICFPT 2013, pp. 160-167, December 2013. 
[25] L. Gaspar, V. Fischer, F. Bernard, L. Bossuet, P. Cotret, “HCrypt: A Novel Reconfigurable Cryp-
to-processor with Secured Key Management”, In the Proceedings of the International Conference 
on ReConFigurable Computing and FPGAs, ReConFig 2010, pp. 280-285, 2010. 
[26] J.F. Gallais, J. Großschädl, N. Hanley, M. Kasper, M. Medwed, F. Regazzoni, J.M. Schmidt, S. 
Tillich, and M. Wójcik, “Hardware Trojans for Inducing or Amplifying Side-Channel Leakage of 
Cryptographic Software,” In Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Trusted Sys-
tems, INTRUST 2010, pp. 253-270, December 2010. 
[27] D. Du, S. Narasimhan, R. S. Chakraborty, and S. Bhunia, “Self-referencing: A Scalable Side-
Channel Approach for Hardware Trojan Detection,” In Proceedings of Workshop on Crypto-
21 
graphic Hardware and Embedded Systems,  CHES 2010, Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science,  vol. 6225, pp. 173-187, August 2010. 
[28] S. Narasimhan, D. Dongdong, R.S. Chakraborty, S. Paul, F.G. Wolff, C.A. Papachristou, K. Roy, 
and S. Bhunia, “Hardware Trojan Detection by Multiple-Parameter Side-Channel Analysis,” 
IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol.62, no.11, pp. 2183-2195, November 2013. 
[29] R. Rad, J. Plusquellic, and M. Tehranipoor, “A Sensitivity Analysis of Power Signal Methods for 
Detecting Hardware Trojans Under Real Process and Environmental Conditions,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, vol.18, no.12, pp. 1735-1744, December 
2010. 
[30] P. Bayon, L. Bossuet, A. Aubert, V. Fischer, F. Poucheret, B. Robisson and P. Maurine, “Con-
tactless Electromagnetic Active Attack on Ring Oscillator Based True Random Number Genera-
tor”, in Proceedings on International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Se-
cure Design, COSADE 2012, Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,  vol. 7275, pp. 151-
166, May 2012. 
[31] P. Bayon, L. Bossuet, A. Aubert, V. Fischer, “EM leakage analysis on True Random Number 
Generator: Frequency and localization retrieval method”, in Proceedings of the Asia Pacific In-
ternational Symposium and Exhibition on Electromagnetic Compatibility, APEMC 2013, May 
2013. 
[32] Virtual Silicon Inc. 0.18 μm VIP Standard Cell Library Tape Out Ready, Part Number: 
UMCL18G212T3, Process: UMC Logic 0.18 μm Generic II Technology: 0.18μm, 2004. 
[33] R. Torrance, and D. James, “The state-of-the-art in semiconductor reverse engineering,” In Pro-
ceedings of the 48th Design Automation Conference, DAC 2011, ACM/EDAC/IEEE , pp. 333-
338, 2011 
[34] P. Subramanyan, N. Tsiskaridze, W. Li, A. Gascon, W. Tan, A. Tiwari, N. Shankar, S. Seshia, 
and S. Malik, “Reverse Engineering Digital Circuits Using Structural and Functional Analyses,” 
in IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing, 2013. 
[35] D. Agrawal, S. Baktir, D. Karakoyunlu, P. Rohatgi, and B Sunar, “Trojan Detection using IC 
Fingerprinting” in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 296-310, 
2007. 
[36] Y. Jin, and Y. Makris, “Hardware Trojan Detection using Path Delay Fingerprint” in IEEE Inter-
national Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, HOST 2008, pp. 51-57, 2008. 
[37] Tektronix, RSA5000 Series, Spectrum Analyzers Datasheet, 2015. 
Available online: http://www.tek.com/sites/tek.com/files/media/media/resources/RSA5000-
Series-Spectrum-Analyzers-Datasheet-37W2627414_1.pdf 
[38] M. Kasper, A. Moradi, G.T. Becker, O. Mischke, T. Güneysu, C. Paar and W. Burleson, “Side 
Channels as Building Blocks”, In Journal of Cryptography Engineering, Springer, vol. 2, no. 3, 
pp. 143-159, 2012. 
[39] M. Tehranipoor, U. Guin, D. Forte. Counterfeit Integrated Circuits - Detection and Avoidance. 
Springer, 2015. 
[40] L. Bossuet, X. T. Ngo, Z. Cherif, V. Fischer. A PUF based on a transient effect ring oscillator and 
insensitive to locking phenomenon. IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing, Vol. 
2, Issue 1, pp. 30-36, 2014. 
[41] N. Kamoun, L. Bossuet, and A. Ghazel, “Correlated Power Noise Generator as a Low Cost DPA 
Countermeasure to Secure Hardware AES Cipher,” In Proceedings of the International Confer-
ence on Signals, Circuits and Systems, SCS 2009, pp. 1-6, 2009. 
 
